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THE EFFECT OF TREATIES AND OTHER FORMAL




The object of this discussion is to offer a way of evaluating the impact of
treaties and other formal international acts upon the customary international
law of human rights. Its basic premise is that this issue is not simple, and
not to be answered categorically. That is, it seems questionable to accept
any view of the problem which focuses, for example, simply upon the status
of treaties as treaties, without considering the circumstances of each treaty
under discussion.
The approach taken in this paper is to, first, offer a way about thinking of
the concept of a legal rule. The paper then applies this generalization about
legal rules to rules of customary international law in an effort to determine
criteria for deciding when such rules may be said to exist. It applies these
criteria to the question of the impact upon the customary international law
of human rights of human rights treaties and certain other international acts.
Finally, the discussion asks whether it truly matters whether human rights
rules have any basis in international law other than as treaty requirements.
II. DETERMINING THE EXISTENCE OF LAW
In thinking about the subject of customary international law, it can be
helpful to think about the idea of law in general. The subject is endless,
however, and the possible points of view one can take toward it are close to
innumerable. Selection, therefore, is unavoidable.
* Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. A.B., Princeton
University, 1970; J.D., University of Michigan, 1976. The author wishes to acknowledge with
gratitude the assistance of Patrick S. Hotze, Esquire, of the United States Department of State,
of the Reference Department of the Walter R. Davis Library of the University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill, and of the Public Documents Office of the Perkins Library of Duke
University; their aid in providing access to documents which were otherwise impossible to
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Given the necessity of selecting an avenue of approach, this paper starts
by asking, if a social institution is to be characterized as a legal system, what
does this mean? What does such an assertion convey about the system in
question? In other words, what does a legal system look like?
In answering this question, this discussion will accept the view of H.L.A.
Hart that a legal system is an institution intended to affect behavior by
coercing obedience to the system's rules.' Professors McDougal2 and
Reisman3 have also insisted that a putative legal rule's status as law depends
in part upon the ability and intention of the rule-promulgating authority to
control the behavior to which the rule is directed. It follows therefore that
one can identify a rule of a legal system by observing the behavior of those
persons within the system charged with coercing obedience to a rule. If
violation of a putative rule is met with coercion from such persons, it is at
least possible that the putative rule is in fact a rule of the system. Converse-
ly, if the system's authorities do not react to violations of a putative rule, its
status as a rule is doubtful.
The foregoing raises a number of problems. In the first place, it focuses
on violations of a rule. It is certainly possible, however, to imagine a
community so law-abiding that the question of reacting to rule violations
never arises, since rules are never violated. It would be highly paradoxical
to exclude from a legal system those rules taken so seriously that no
coercion is necessary to induce obedience to them. We should, therefore,
broaden our definition of legal rules to include not only those norms
enforced by a system's authorities, but also those which are so widely
observed that enforcement is not necessary. According to this view, then,
for a norm to be considered a rule of a particular legal system, those subject
to the system must either obey the rule or be sanctioned when they violate
it.
A second problem is presented by references to "the system's rules."
Determining the meaning of that term in different contexts can be difficult.
For our purposes, however, it is unnecessary to spend much time on this
point. If a legal system is a social institution intended to affect behavior by
1H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 84 (1960).
2 Myres S. McDougal, Law and Minimum World Public Order: Armed Conflict in Larger
Context, 3 UCLA PAC. BAsIN L.J. 21, 23-24 (1984).
3 W. Michael Reisman, International Lawmaking: A Process of Communication: the
Harold D. Lasswell Memorial Lecture, in AM. SOC'Y INT'L L., PROC. OF THE 75TH
ANNrvERsARY CONVOCATION 101, 111 (1983).
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coercing obedience to certain rules, the system's rules are simply those to
which obedience is coerced. It follows further that such a system must have
some means of generating rules and of determining whether a putative rule
has been properly generated. But while it is obviously possible to spend
considerable time on the implication of these two necessities, it is enough for
us to posit that they exist in any legal system, by definition. That is, to
assert that an institution is a legal system is to assert that this system has
some means of creating rules and of determining the content of the body of
rules it has created.
A more serious difficulty is raised by the idea that nonenforcement of a
rule by a system's authorities raises doubts about the rule's legal status. It
is easy to think of cases in which such an assertion would be doubtful. For
example, suppose the legislature of some American state enacted statutes
purporting to criminalize various forms of gambling, but that police officers
in parts of the state neglected to enforce those statutes. It would certainly
be accurate to characterize the statutes as unenforced in those parts of the
state, but it seems wrong to say that the failures of the police mean that the
statutes have ceased to be legal rules.
It would appear, upon reflection, that the problem is presented because an
insistence upon enforcement as the sole test of a rule's legality does not take
account of the nature of relatively highly developed legal systems. In such
systems, the system's rules for determining whether legal rules have been
created limit the authority to create and repeal legal rules to a particular
group of people. The duty to enforce such rules, however, is in such
systems often borne by other people. In systems where the people who have
the authority to create legal rules are different from those who have the duty
to enforce such rules, a focus upon enforcement alone distorts the system,
ignoring what Hart would presumably call the system's rules of recognition.4
Within the context of a given system, obvious difficulties are presented by
simultaneously asserting, first, that law-making and -repealing authority is
limited to certain persons in particular positions, and second, that the actions
of different persons not occupying such positions have had the effect of
repealing a legal rule through non-enforcement. In such a system, it would
seem necessary to acknowledge that a rule's pedigree-that is, its establish-
ment by persons vested by the system with law-creating authority-will
4 HART, supra note 1, at 92-93.
3 This use of the term "pedigree" derives from THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF
LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONs 94-110 (1990).
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under normal circumstances be the only determinant of its legal status.
Whether or not it is enforced in a particular circumstance would not be
relevant to a rule's legal status.
A corollary of the foregoing, however, is that such problems are presented
only in relatively differentiated systems. In a system in which no distinction
is made either between legislators and enforcers or between actions with
legislative effects and actions limited to enforcement, the contradiction
identified in the preceding paragraph cannot arise. As to such undeveloped
legal systems, then, it would appear reasonable to maintain the position that
a rule's legal status depends on whether it is obeyed or, in cases of
disobedience, whether coercion is exerted to compel obedience.
Aside from the foregoing, a further factor relevant to determining a rule's
legal status is the time-perspective from which the inquiry is made. That is,
if the issue is whether X was a legal rule 300 years ago in social unit Y, one
can investigate what happened 300 years ago in Y in order to reach a
conclusion. If, however, the question is whether X would be applied as a
legal rule tomorrow in social unit Y, the approach must be different. Instead
of seeking to determine what the system's coercers did in the past with
respect to enforcing a rule, one would be seeking to determine what such
persons would do in the future if faced with a situation which has not yet
arisen. That is, one would be engaged in prediction. Of course, what has
been done in the past may well be very helpful in making such a prediction,
but one would be justified in considering the enforcing authorities' past
behavior only if there was reason to believe that such consideration would
in fact be an aid in predicting future enforcing behavior. Further, presum-
ably any information which would facilitate an accurate prediction as to
future enforcing behavior would be relevant to determining what legal rules
would be applied at some future point.
What information one would seek in such a situation obviously depends
on the legal system in question. If a given system were highly organized
such that enforcement authorities more or less automatically enforced statutes
enacted by the legislature, then simply knowing that a statute had been
enacted would justify the assumption that its requirements would be enforced
in the future. The situation would necessarily be much more complicated in
a legal system that was not highly organized. If law-making was not an
activity sharply differentiated from other activity and if authority to
participate in making and enforcing law was widely dispersed, many types
of information would be useful and indeed necessary in making one's
prediction as to future enforcement. In any case, the touchstone is to keep
[Vol. 25:99
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in mind that, in such a situation, one is seeking information which facilitates
predictions.
III. DETERMINING THE EXISTENCE OF RULES OF CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. The "Obey or be Sanctioned" Standard
It remains to apply the foregoing to customary international law.
Assuming the correctness of what was argued in the preceding section, it
seems that, in order to be able to properly characterize a norm as a rule of
customary international law, it must be true either that states very seldom
violate the norm-such that the question of enforcement does not arise-or
that the international legal system is prepared to employ its characteristic
means of coercion in response to violations of the norm. Given the nature
of the international legal system, "characteristic means of coercion"
necessarily must refer to actions by states, either individually or collectively,
as states are the only entities involved in international law controlling means
of coercion.6 Of course, the form coercion might take would vary from case
to case. What is crucial, however, to permit the characterization of a norm
as a rule of customary law, is that states refuse to acquiesce in a breach of
the norm, but on the contrary actively seek to reverse the effects of the
breach.
The preceding paragraph employs the simpler version of the "obey or be
sanctioned" test discussed above; that is, it rejects the possibility that the
circumstances of the promulgation of a norm as a rule of customary
international law may be so authoritative as to render irrelevant any
subsequent lack of enforcement. Since this point is important to this
discussion, it seems necessary to make it explicit and to explain why this
conclusion is justified.
To understand this conclusion, it is necessary to reflect upon the structure
of the international legal system. That system is radically decentralized.
Although it exists primarily to regulate the behavior of states, there are no
6 Of course, some international organizations have the authority to coerce their members
in particular circumstances, for example, the authority conferred on the Security Council of
the United Nations by Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. Not only are such
organizations composed of. states, but neither do they possess tools of coercion beyond those
provided by the member states.
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states who are formally excluded from being one of the system's "authori-
ties". On the contrary, all states are eligible at all times to take part in the
creation of customary international law. Further, the same states who
possess law-creating authority are also and simultaneously the only enforcers
of rules of customary law, as there are no international institutions possessing
any instruments of coercion not provided by states. Finally, any act of a
state, including a violation of an existing rule of law,7 may contribute to the
development of a new rule of law.
Adding all these factors together, it is very difficult to imagine how one
could establish a pedigree for a rule of customary law which was proof
against non-enforcement. Such a pedigree would require some way of
distinguishing acts which can create or "repeal" an international legal rule
from other types of acts by states. But what form could such a distinction
take? It is not possible to rely on the identity of the state actors since, as
noted above, all states are capable of taking part in the law-creating process.
Nor could one insist that some formal criteria justify attributing less weight
to some acts than others, since there is no "constitution" for the international
community establishing such criteria. Of course, it might be possible to
determine inductively that states in fact are especially likely to adhere to the
"obey or be sanctioned" standard as to rules generated in particular ways.
Obviously, however, to validate a method of rule generation by reference to
this standard hardly establishes that rules can exist which do not satisfy the
standard. Finally, it is not possible to build a pedigree by distinguishing
between acts done by states in their capacities as legislators of international
law and acts by states as enforcers of international law, both because states
fill both capacities simultaneously and because so many acts of states address
both the creation and the enforcement of legal rules. In sum, it is very hard
to explain how a rule of customary law can be insulated from testing against
the "obey or be sanctioned" standard.
It must be noted that numerous authorities disagree with the foregoing
argument. They would insist that particular rules of international law have
become so firmly established that contrary practice or an absence of
enforcement are irrelevant to determining the rules' legal status. To
demonstrate these rules' established character, these writers rely on the rules'
widespread acceptance, on their importance, or on the frequency with which
ANTHoNY D'AMATo, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 97-98 (1971).
104 [Vol. 25:99
EFFECT OF TREATIES
states refer to the rules' character as legal rules.' These positions, it would
appear, share a common characteristic: despite their different phrasing, they
all argue that, through some means, there has been demonstrated such a
broad appreciation of the fundamental character of some rules that ignoring
their importance would amount to almost willful blindness.
If this is a fair characterization of these approaches, then it would appear
that they suffer from an internal contradiction. In essence they say, "Certain
rules have been accepted to the point that they have become fundamental;
therefore, failures to obey the rules or to sanction violators simply are beside
the point." But if there are so many cases in which transgressions of the rule
have evoked no sanctions that the legal status of the rule is questioned, what
is the basis for asserting that the rule has been accepted as important?
Presumably, the least ambiguous way states can demonstrate their acceptance
of particular rules of law is by following those rules and by insisting that
other states do so as well. If a given state does not adhere to a rule or react
to other states' violations of that rule, surely that state's attitude toward the
rule cannot be called one of whole-hearted acceptance, even if its officials
have in some contexts and in various ways expressed positive sentiments
concerning the rule. In other words, it would appear that the best way to
decide whether a state "accepts" a rule or whether it regards the rule as
"fundamental" is by examining the state's behavior to determine whether and
to what extent the state has followed the rule and how it has reacted to
violations of the rule by other states. 9
' It is not possible to list all the writers who have taken this position. A partial listing
would include: RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNrrED
STATES § 701, nn.1,2 (1986); Oscar Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice:
General Course in Public International Law, 1982-IV R.C.A.D.I. 9, 333-37; authorities cited
in Bruno Simma & Philip Alston, The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens,
and General Principles, 12 AUSTL. Y.B. INT'L L. 82, 91-92, 93-94 (1992).
' Indeed, it would seem that any other approach could give rise to strange paradoxes.
Consider the case of a state whose representatives frequently assert, in various fora, the
importance and fundamental character of a particular human rights rule, for example, the rule
forbidding the employment of torture by states. Assume that, despite its representatives'
pronouncements, the state regularly tortures certain categories of persons-political prisoners,
perhaps. Suppose it is asserted, as of year X, that the state's practice has contributed to the
emergence of a rule of customary international law forbidding torture by states, the assertion
being grounded on the statements by the states' representatives. Suppose that, in year X plus
3, it is asserted that the state's practice of torturing political prisoners is violative of the
customary law rule forbidding torture. Suppose finally that the state's practice regarding
torture did not change at all over the period X minus three through X plus three. What are
1995/96]
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If the state ignores the rule in practice, it would seem inaccurate to
characterize it as "accepting" the rule in any meaningful sense; nor is it clear
how a rule could be considered "fundamental" to a state if that state does not
in practice apply the rule.' Indeed, it might be asked whether it does not
distort the concept of law to the point of meaninglessness to define it to
include rules which are likely in many cases to be neither obeyed nor
enforced when disobeyed.
One further point must be addressed before leaving this subject. This
paper has referred to the importance of enforcement in determining the
existence of a rule of customary law. It has also noted that such enforce-
ment must necessarily be carried out by states. However, it has not
addressed the problem of determining which states enforce which rules.
Indeed, the discussion to this point could be read as defining as part of
customary law only those rules which all states seek to enforce every time
they are breached. If that definition were employed, then there would be
very little customary law indeed, since few breaches of even uncontroversial
rules of customary law evoke such widespread reactions. Further, given the
decentralized character of the international legal system, it would be both
difficult in practice and paradoxical in principle to insist on such an approach
we to make of the allegation against the state?
If it is asserted that its behavior in X plus 3 is inconsistent with a rule against torture, how
could the identical behavior in year X contribute to the formation of that rule? Conversely,
if it is assumed that, when a state's behavior is deemed to contribute to the emergence of a
customary rule, the rule embodies whatever that behavior included, then the state's behavior
does not violate the rule. But that would force the reformulation of the rule: instead of
construing the rule as forbidding states to engage in torture, it would be necessary to read the
rule as permitting states to engage in torture while requiring them to denounce the practice.
'0 The same argument could be made in response to the position taken by Professors
Simma and Alston, supra note 8, at 102-06, that human rights principles could more easily
be understood as forming part of international law as "general principles of law recognized
by civilized nations" than as rules of customary international law. They argue that reiterations
of principles by states-in treaties, in international fora, in international dealings general-
ly-ought to be enough to constitute the "recognition" of the principles within the meaning
of Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 3; 59 StaL
1055, 1060 (1945). Assuming for the sake of argument that such recognition at the
international level would be adequate to satisfy Article 38, the question remains as to how
recognition of a norm as a general principle of law is to be demonstrated. That is, in what
sense has a state recognized a principle as legally binding upon itself when its behavior
ignores the principle and its acceptance is only expressed in circumstances that lead to no
acknowledgment of any authority in any other state or in any international body to demand
compliance with the principle?
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to enforcement. Rather, in the common case in which the breach of a
customary rule by one state violates the legal rights of one or several other
identifiable states, surely it is enough if the affected states act to enforce the
rule in question. Indeed, in such circumstances, one could question the basis
for any action taken by a state whose rights were not affected; such action
might be seen as a claim by the unaffected state to some sort of general
supervisory authority over other states, which would hardly be consistent
with the decentralized character of the international legal system.
One consequence of the foregoing, however, is that states' failure to
enforce violations of rules which especially affect them raise doubts about
the legal status of those rules. As this paper has argued, acquiescence by a
system's authorities in violations of a legal rule amounts to a "repeal" of that
rule. If in a given situation the relevant "authority" is a particularly affected
state, the relevant non-enforcement is likewise that of the particularly
affected state.
Imagine, however, an international legal duty whose breach by a state
would not in principle particularly affect any other state or states. Rules
requiring states to respect the human rights of their own nationals are an
obvious example of such duties, since their breach would not especially
affect any other identifiable state. To speak of enforcement of such duties
by states particularly harmed by their breach, then, would make no sense,
since there would be no such states. But to say that a breach does not harm
interests peculiar to any one state is not to say that it harms no state
interests, since states may share interests in common, such that a breach of
duty-though not affecting one state more than another-affects all states.
In such a case, since the duty by definition is one owed to all states,
presumably any state ought to be able to respond to a breach of the duty.
Indeed, there is support for the proposition that international law recognizes
such erga omnes obligations and permits enforcement of them by any
state."
This concept of erga omnes obligations requires special comment in light
of the employment in this discussion of the "obey or be sanctioned" standard
for identifying rules of customary law. More specifically, two points seem
important. First, it would appear that there are some duties in international
law which, if they exist at all, must be erga omnes. This follows simply
because there are some duties whose breach could not plausibly be said to
1 Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co., Ltd. (BeIg. v. Sp.), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 32 (Second
Phase) (Judgment of Feb. 5).
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affect some states more than others, such that there would be no logical basis
for describing a breach of the duty as peculiarly harmful to any one state or
group of states. In such a case, whatever harm the duty exists to prevent
must therefore be shared by all states if it exists at all.
The second point follows from the first. If a rule is characterized as erga
omnes, by definition any state may assert a claim based on its breach.
Conversely, rejection by particular states or groups of states of any interest
in a putative erga omnes obligation necessarily amounts to a denial that the
obligation exists. This must follow, since the obligation-if it exists-runs
to all states. Just as acquiescence by a state in an action arguably violative
of rights peculiar to it raises doubts as to the existence of the right in
question, so a state's denial of interest in enforcing an erga omnes rules
undercuts the argument that rule in fact is erga omnes. And if the rule is
one that, by its nature, must be erga omnes if it exists at all, to deny its erga
omnes character is to deny the rule's existence.
This observation has consequences for the application of the "obey or be
sanctioned" standard to the customary law of human rights. It would appear
that rules of customary law protecting human rights must be erga omnes if
they exist, since their breach cannot be said to affect one state more than
another. Thus the attitudes of all states toward the enforcement of such rules
are relevant for determining whether the "obey or be sanctioned" standard
is satisfied. In other words, since there are no states not affected by a breach
of the rule, there are no states whose reactions to the breach are irrelevant.
Application of the standard in this context, then, requires a broad survey of
state attitudes; even incidents in which some states react to a violation of
human rights by imposing sanctions on the violator could actually lead to a
weakening of the applicable human rights rule if others react in a manner
demonstrating their belief that no enforceable obligation has been breached.
In sum, given the character of the international legal system, a rule must
satisfy the "obey or be sanctioned" standard if it is to be considered a rule
of that system; the system is simply too decentralized to permit reliance on
a rule's pedigree to establish its status. Further, if the rule in question must
be an erga omnes rule if it exists, then the reactions of all states to particular
cases of violations of the rule are relevant to a determination whether a given
rule satisfies the standard.
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B. Customary International Law and Treaties
The foregoing addresses customary international law generally. The focus
of this paper, however, is the relationship between human rights treaties and
the customary international law of human rights. How can treaties and
customary law relate?12
The first point to make follows from the discussion above. If a rule of
customary law is one that satisfies the obey or be sanctioned standard, then
treaties are relevant to custom to the extent that they aid in determining
whether that standard is satisfied in a given case. More specifically, treaties
can give some indication of the likelihood that states will, subsequent to the
date of the treaty's adoption, adhere to a given standard of behavior. They
can also permit predictions as to the probability of enforcement action if
particular putative norms are violated.
This information can be conveyed in a variety of ways. In the first place,
a treaty can provide information about the parties' view of the state of
customary international law at the time of the treaty's conclusion. For
example, imagine a fishing treaty between two states. Suppose that treaty
included a provision to the effect that fishing vessels of each state would be
permitted to fish in the other's territorial sea "as defined by customary
international law", but further provided "except that for reasons of State Y's
economic security, vessels of State X shall not be permitted to fish in that
portion of Y's territorial sea defined by [designated latitude/longitude
points]." Surely this language would imply that, in the view of States X and
Y, the area from which the X vessels were excluded fell within Y's
territorial sea as defined by customary international law. Such a treaty thus
provides information as to the views of two states on the rules of customary
law regarding the extent of a coastal state's territorial sea. It should be
stressed that such indications of states' views as to the content of customary
law at a particular period are relevant because they facilitate the prediction
as to future behavior which, as noted above, is an essential aspect of
determining the content of customary law. This follows because it seems
reasonable to assume that, if a given state sees a particular rule as legally
binding at one point in time, it will continue to hold that view at some later
point, absent some basis for believing that the state's view has changed.
And it likewise seems reasonable to assume that, if the state at the later point
2 This subject is addressed at greater length in Arthur M. Weisburd, Customary
International Law: The Problem of Treaties, 12 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1 (1988).
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views the rule in question as legally binding, it will conform its conduct to
that rule.
Aside from providing a snapshot of custom at the time of the treaty's
drafting, a treaty may also bear on customary law by giving rise to a rule
which passes into custom. 1 3 That is, parties to the treaty may come to treat
the treaty's rules as binding quite apart from their treaty context, and
non-party states may begin adhering to a rule drawn from a treaty despite
their non-party status. The treaty's language may be useful in predicting
whether such developments are likely. Of course, it is always possible that
a particular treaty will come to be applied in a manner different from that
implied by its language; for that reason, it would be a mistake to insist that
one can simply assume that future behavior by treaty parties will conform
to that required by the apparent meaning of the treaty text. Correspondingly,
it would be a mistake to insist that the prediction of future behavior, which
is essential to determining the content of customary law, may be based solely
on the treaty's language, without regard to practice under the treaty.
Nonetheless, it is hardly unreasonable to assume that the behavior of treaty
parties will conform to their treaty obligations until there is some reason to
think otherwise. Analysis of a treaty's text, then, may be relevant to an
investigation of customary law by facilitating the prediction of future state
behavior.
Of course, whether a rule of customary law exists depends on the general
practice of states, 4 and the mere conclusion of a treaty does not establish
that the treaty's rules either represent customary law at the time of the
treaty's conclusion or that they will become customary law. Obviously, for
example, if all one knew about a particular norm was that it was embodied
in a particular bilateral treaty, one would hesitate to conclude that the norm
represented customary law. In this connection, the pattern of adherence to
the treaty is relevant to the treaty's status.15 The more states that become
parties to the treaty, the easier it is to argue that its rules have passed into
customary law.
13 See North Sea Continental Shelf Case (F.R.G. v. Den.) (F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J.
3 (Judgment of Feb. 20), 71 [hereinafter North Sea Case].
14 Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38, para. b, 59 Stat
1055, 1060 (1945); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 102 (1986).
" See North Sea Case, 1969 I.C.J. 3, 1 73.
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Finally, the practice of parties to a treaty may be relevant toward an
understanding of the their view of custom. For example, suppose a treaty
requires the parties to accord one another certain rights. Suppose one of the
states parties scrupulously observes its treaty obligations in this regard, but
regularly denies the same rights to states not parties to the treaty on the basis
of their non-party status. Obviously, such behavior would indicate that the
state in question viewed its obligation to accord the rights as purely a matter
of treaty law, with customary law not requiring behavior toward non-parties
similar to that required by the treaty toward parties.
Admittedly, the foregoing is somewhat abstract. This paper will therefore
turn to applying these principles to the treaties which are the focus of the
discussion, those dealing with human rights.
IV. TREATIES AND THE CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
OF HUMAN RIGHTS
A. Introduction
The following discussion will examine a number of aspects of the
relationship between certain human rights treaties and the customary law of
human rights. It will focus on three elements of the regimes of the treaties
examined: their texts; the pattern of adherence to them, including the nature
of reservations interposed by the states parties; and finally some aspects of
practice under the treaties. In each case, the purpose of the inquiry is to
determine what prediction regarding future state behavior may be based on
the treaty under discussion. More specifically, the question is, does the
instrument in question support a prediction that states generally will either
adhere to a particular rule, or else will encounter sanctions if the rule is
violated?
Unfortunately, this discussion cannot address all relevant human rights
treaties if it is to be of reasonable length. It therefore focuses on three: the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 6 (the Covenant), the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
16 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 58 Fed. Reg. 45,
934 (1993), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter Covenant].
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Women17 (the CEDAW), and the Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment18 (the CAT).
B. Treaty Texts
1. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
As is well known, the Covenant-as well as the companion International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights19 -was adopted by the
United Nations with a view toward putting into a concrete, legal form the
duty of states to respect the rights recognized in the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights. ° Each party to the Covenant "undertakes to ensure to
all individuals present within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the
rights recognized in the present Covenant.. ."21 The Covenant then goes
on to require each party to respect a broad spectrum of rights-the rights to
life, to equal protection of the law, and to marry; the right to freedom of
religion, association, and expression, and the rights to be free from torture,
slavery, servitude, arbitrary arrest and unfair criminal proceedings, to name
but a few.22 Clearly, this language, together with that of the individual
articles of the substantive portion of the instrument, is best interpreted as
intended to impose on the states parties an obligation to afford to the
individuals specified the rights addressed in the Covenant.
The issue for this discussion, it should be stressed, is not that of
determining the exact character of the treaty obligation assumed by the
parties to this Covenant. Rather, the question is one of determining what
impact this treaty has had on the customary international law of human
rights. Treaty interpretation questions are important, therefore, only as they
bear on this question of the content of customary international law.
17 Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women, Dec.
18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter CEDAW].
18 Covenant against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 197,
U.N. Doc. A/Res/39/46 (1984) [hereinafter CAT].
"' International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 3, 1966, 993
U.N.T.S. 3.
2o G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948).
21 Covenant, supra note 16, art. 2(1).
2 Id. arts. 6-27.
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What then can we learn from the text of the Covenant? First, we can
gather some information regarding the state of customary international law
at the time the Covenant was signed, as perceived by the states who drafted
the covenant. Second, we can reach conclusions about the character state
practice would have taken if the Covenant was applied in practice as its
language would apparently require. This latter point is relevant to the
capacity of the instrument itself to generate rules of law, which is to be
distinguished from its capacity to inspire practice which becomes law but
which differs in some important particulars from the Covenant's own regime.
Considering the state of customary law at the time of the Covenant's
drafting, then, it would appear that its text supports two propositions: first,
that a state's treatment of its own nationals could not be considered a matter
purely of the state's internal affairs, such that any form of outside interest in
the subject amounted to an unlawful interference in those internal affairs; and
second, that states had no international legal obligation, outside the treaty
context, to respect the human rights of its nationals. Obviously, both of
these observations require comment.
The first point follows necessarily from the fact of the Covenant's
existence. It would seem to be a contradiction in terms to characterize a
subject which states deem to be an appropriate object for a multilateral treaty
to be something exclusively a matter of the domestic jurisdiction of states.
While labelling a subject an appropriate matter for interstate concern does
not specify the form that concern may take, at least the fact of the Coven-
ant's creation would indicate that customary international law would permit
some forms of expressions by states of interest in and dismay over human
rights violations by other states.
At the same time, however, the Covenant is inconsistent with the
proposition that, as of 1966, states saw themselves as having an obligation
under customary international law to refrain from violating the human rights
of individuals. This follows from the Covenant's weak enforcement
provisions. Nothing in the Covenant affirmatively authorizes any enti-
ty--either another state, or a group of states, or the Human Rights Commit-
tee established by Article 2823 -to enforce the obligations created by the
Covenant against any state party. The only requirement which is mandatory
for all parties is that of making reports to the Human Rights Committee.'
To be sure, the Covenant establishes a procedure whereby a state party may
21 Id. art. 28.
2 Id. art. 40.
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communicate to the Human Rights Committee its belief that another state
party is violating the Covenant. This method of enforcement is available,
however, only if both states have explicitly recognized the competence of the
Human Rights Committee to receive such communications. Further, the
Covenant permits the Human Rights Committee only to make good offices
available to the states concerned in the matter, and, if such efforts fail, to
appoint a Conciliation Commission, with the consent of the states in
question.' The Human Rights Committee is not empowered to make any
binding determinations under the Covenant.
The implications of this limitation on enforcement would seem clear.
Under the Covenant, the Human Rights Committee may act on an interstate
communication only against a state which has specially consented to its
authority, only if the communicating state has similarly consented, and only
to the extent of, in essence, mediating between the states involved. These
limitations make sense only if it is assumed that the Covenant affords no
interstate means of enforcement beyond those methods spelled out in its text.
If states parties could make claims against one another for breaches of the
Covenant in the manner usually available to parties to treaties, the provisions
of Articles 41 and 42 limiting both the possibility and the consequences of
interstate complaints would be useless. Applying the rule that a treaty is to
be interpreted as a whole,' the only way to interpret the Covenant which
takes account of Article 41's limitations is to read it as excluding remedies
for violations other than those mentioned in its text.
27
2 Id. arts. 41, 42.
' See Case Concerning the Air Services Agreement of 27 March 1946 (U.S. v. Fr.), 54
I.L.R. 303, 328-29 (Arbitral Trib. established by compromis of July 11, 1978, 1978), and
authorities cited therein.
2 It should be noted that some authors reject this conclusion. Professors Henkin and
Simma, for example, both argue that the usual remedies available to parties to multilateral
treaties in the event of breaches of those treaties should be understood to be available to
parties to the Covenant, despite the language of Article 41. Louis Henkin, Human Rights and
"Domestic Jurisdiction', in T. BUERGENTHAL & J. HALL, HUMAN RIGHTS, INTERNATIONAL
LAw AND THE HELSINKI ACCORD 21, 29-33 (1977); Bruno Simma, Consent: Strains in the
Treaty System, in R. ST. J. MACDONALD & DOUGLAS M. JOHNSTON, THE STRUCTURE AND
PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY DOCTRINE AND THEORY
485, 502 (1983). Professor Simma thus asserts:
... [I]t must be emphasized that multilateral treaties for the protection of
human rights, like all others, embody correlative rights and duties
between the contracting parties ut singuli, resulting in a duty for each
party to fulfill its obligations vis-a-vis all the others, and conversely, in
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a right for each party to demand compliance from every other party.
conventional [sic] mechanisms, if they are available in concrete cases,
naturally have precedence over bilateral enforcement, but they do not
preclude it. He who asserts a departure from this general rule must prove
it. He would have to show that all parties have had the intention of
depriving human rights treaties of one of their most important driving
forces. Such proof cannot be supplied.
Id. (footnotes omitted). It would appear, however, that Professor Simma is mistaken as to the
nature of the proof required to displace the general rule he cites. It would seem that the
question turns, not on the parties' intentions in general, but on their understanding of the
effect of the text of the treaty to which they agreed. That is, the issue is whether the parties
to the drafting of the Covenant understood that the effect of its language was to eliminate the
availability of the usual remedies for breach. If they did, and nonetheless adopted this
language, then the treaty presumably should be read in line with this understanding of its
consequences. Further, if the drafters understood the treaty to have this effect, it would
appear irrelevant that some of them clearly would have preferred a different system. The
question is not, did all parties want a treaty with limited remedies, but rather, did they draft
a treaty which they all agreed provided only limited remedies, however reluctant some of
them may have been to do so.
We are thus faced with interpreting the Covenant. Obviously, some commentators would
not agree that the text of that treaty clearly compels the interpretation offered in the text of
this article. In such a situation, where a treaty's text arguably supports differing interpreta-
tions, it is permissible to consult its negotiating history to aid in interpretation. Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 32, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. And the
history of the Covenant makes clear that the states involved in its drafting understood that
remedies for breaches of the Covenant other than those specified in its text were not to be
available.
This conclusion is compelled by an examination of the debates of the Third Committee of
the United Nations General Assembly regarding the article of the Covenant which became
Article 41. In the form presented to the Third Committee by the Commission on Human
Rights, the relevant article of the draft Covenant (Article 40 in the draft) would have given
the Human Rights Committee authority to initiate a fact-finding and conciliation procedure
against any party to the Covenant upon the complaint of any other party; submission to the
Committee's authority in this regard was mandatory for all parties. Report of the Third
Committee, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., T[ 398, 410, U.N. Doc. A/6546 (1966). A number of
states objected to the mandatory character of the Human Rights Committee's authority; nine
states offered an amendment which limited the Committee's authority in this regard to those
states who had accepted that authority, and then only in cases of "complaints"-later revised
to "communications"-from states which had themselves accepted that authority. Id. It 402,
403, 410. France in turn offered an amendment which, while altering the Commission's draft,
would have retained the mandatory character of the Human Rights Committee's authority.
Id. 1 405. The Third Committee rejected the French amendment, and instead adopted the
nine-state substitute for the language originally proposed by the Human Rights Commission.
Id. 9t 419-20. The debates make clear that this step was taken for several reasons. Some
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iurthermore, a reading of the Covenant as precluding claims by states
against other states for human rights violations as breaches of treaty implies
a view as to the customary law status, as of 1966, of the rights listed in the
Covenant. Specifically, that reading implies that the states who participated
in the Covenant's drafting assumed that customary international law provided
no basis for claims by states against other states for human rights violations.
This follows, again, from Article 41. Just as that article makes no sense if
parties to the Covenant could circumvent its strictures by making treaty--
based claims against other parties, so it would make no sense if customary
states saw mandatory authority in the Committee as inconsistent with their sovereignty.
Others-though not objecting to a mandatory regime for themselves-feared that other states'
objections to such a regime would make such states hesitate to become parties to the
Covenant, and argued that it was better to have a widely-ratified Covenant with weak
enforcement provisions than a Covenant with stronger enforcement provisions and fewer
parties. Id. I 408-13.
What is striking about these debates, from the point of view of the present discussion, is
the clear assumption by all participants that the only remedies for breaches of the Covenant
would be those spelled out in its text. After all, if parties to the Covenant were to have the
right to make claims against one another for breaches of its provisions outside the Covenant's
own implementation provisions, whether Article 40 (as it was numbered in the Human Rights
Commission draft) was mandatory or not was largely beside the point. In debate, however,
all participants took for granted that, if Article 40 had no mandatory character, then there
were no mandatory remedies for breaches of the Convention. See U.N. GAOR, 3d Comm.,
21st Sess., 1415th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1415 (1966); U.N. GAOR, 3d Comm., 21st
Sess., 1416th mtg. TI 19 (Costa Rica), 37 (Madagascar), 45 (Belgium), U.N. Doc.
A/C.3/SR.1416 (1966); U.N. GAOR, 3d Comm., 21st Sess., 1417th mtg. M 41-43 (Jamaica),
U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1417 (1966); U.N. GAOR, 3d Comm., 21st Sess., 1418th mtg. 1 11
(Upper Volta), U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1418 (1966). Supporters of the Human Rights
Commission's draft sought to allay the concerns of other states by stressing the relatively
limited powers of the Human Rights Committee, e.g., U.N. GAOR, 3d Comm., 21st Sess.,
1417th mtg. 1 34 (Finland), U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1417 (1966), an argument that would have
been beside the point if, in addition to the Committee's authority, parties to the Covenant
retained the capacity to make claims directly against one another based on the violation of
the Covenant's provisions. Particularly interesting were the comments of the representative
of India, one of the states sponsoring the nine-power amendment which was substituted for
the Human Rights Commission's language. He stated that India's position was motivated in
part "by the feeling that the time had not yet come to set up an international legal system by
the enforcement of human rights throughout the world." U.N. GAOR, 3d Comm., 21st Sess.,
1416th mtg. 2, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1416 (1966). Not only does this comment bear on
India's understanding of the effect of the amendment of which it was a co-sponsor, but it also
indicates that state's view of the status of customary international law at the time this debate
took place.
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law provided a basis for such claims outside the treaty context. Article 41
could have been seen as effective to accomplish its obvious purpose of
shielding states from scrutiny by other states only if the drafters assumed that
customary law provided no basis for ignoring Article 41.
The text of the Covenant, then, indicates that states as of 1966 saw human
rights questions as appropriate matters of international concern, but not as
implicating obligations under customary international law. As pointed out
above, however, the text is important with respect to customary law not only
for the information it provides as to the content of that law in 1966, but also
for its potential to affect that law in the future. But this distinction-though
important in principle-would appear to make no difference in this case.
That is, state behavior which adhered to the scheme of the Covenant could
not be expected to generate a customary international law of human rights,
since that scheme-as explained above-precluded any international legal
enforcement of the Covenant's substantive provisions. Of course, it would
have been possible, after 1966, for state behavior under the Covenant to
depart from the original scheme-for example, there could have evolved
some method of making interstate claims based on the Covenant. The point
to be made here is not that such developments were impossible as of 1966,
but that such a course of events would not have been what one could have
predicted based on the Covenant itself. In short, one could not, in 1966,
have predicted on the basis of the text of the Covenant that states would
come to see human rights rules as enforceable legal norms even outside the
treaty context.
2. The Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women
The CEDAW, which dates from 1979, requires parties to it to eliminate
discrimination against women in broad areas of political, social, economic
and cultural life.28 As is true of the Covenant, the language of its substan-
tive provisions is the language of legal obligation. It would also appear to
have the same two effects on the customary international law of human
rights as did the Covenant. That is, the existence of the CEDAW reinforces
the proposition that human rights questions are matters of international
concern, such that inquiry into and comment about a state's human rights
record by other states or international organizations could not be seen as
2 CEDAW, supra note 16, arts. 2-16.
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unlawful interference in internal affairs. However, the CEDAW's implemen-
tation provisions, as well as those of the Covenant, indicate that its drafters
did not see the obligations it imposed either as enforceable under the treaty
through interstate complaints or, by extension, as enforceable under
customary law without reference to the treaty.
The implementation provisions of the CEDAW are less extensive than
those of the Covenant. It provides for the creation of a Committee on the
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women29 (the Committee) and
further requires states parties to report on their efforts to give effect to the
CEDAW, such reports to be submitted within one year after the CEDAW
enters into force for the reporting states, and thereafter every four years and
when requested by the Committee.' Unlike the Covenant, the CEDAW
makes no provision for complaints that states parties have violated their
obligations under the CEDAW, either from other states parties or from
individuals.
On its face, this last point creates an ambiguity. It might be argued that
the CEDAW's silence on the subject demonstrates that normal interstate
remedies are to be available in cases of breach; unlike the situation under the
Covenant created by that instrument's Article 41, there is no article of the
CEDAW which would be rendered useless if such remedies were deemed to
be available under the latter treaty. On the other hand, the precedent of the
Covenant suggests that the omission from the CEDAW of even optional
complaint procedures indicates that no form of enforcement was to be
available for the CEDAW apart from that inherent in the reporting system.
Resolving this ambiguity justifies consideration of the negotiating history
of the CEDAW. And the negotiating history makes plain the drafters'
assumption that the only remedies for the violation of the CEDAW would
be those specified in its text.3' That assumption, it will be recalled, is
29 1d. art. 17.
3 Id. art. 18.
31 The relevant negotiating history comes from two meetings of the United Nations
Economic and Social Council's Commission on the Status of Women, which was responsible
for drafting the CEDAW. Following the adoption of the CEDAW article which became
Article 18, the Belgian delegate proposed an additional article which would have obligated
the parties to the CEDAW to examine, in the Commission on the Status of Women, the
possibility of adding implementation procedures to the CEDAW which would permit parties
to the convention and their nationals to address the body which, in the final version of the
convention, became the Committee, U.N. ESCOR, Comm. Status of Women, Resumed 26th
Sess., 673d mtg. TI 93-96, U.N. Doc. E/CN.6/SR.673 (1976). The Belgian proposal was
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inconsistent not only with the argument that normal treaty remedies are
available for the violation of the CEDAW, but also with any belief on the
delegates' part that the provisions of the CEDAW restated customary law as
it existed at the time of the CEDAW's finalization. This follows because it
would have made no sense to exclude interstate remedies for acts that
breached the CEDAW if the same acts were also violations of customary law
and thus susceptible to interstate remedies without regard to the treaty.
In sum, as was argued above with respect to the Covenant, the proper
interpretation of the text of the CEDAW undercuts any argument that sex
discrimination was a violation of customary law as of 1976, or for that
matter as of 1979. Further, such an interpretation shows that, unless
implementation of that Convention departed from the method originally
envisaged for it, the CEDAW could not give rise to a rule of customary law
imposing state responsibility for discrimination against women.
considered in the Commission's next meeting, and rejected by a vote of 11-8-3, U.N. ESCOR,
Comm. Status of Women, Resumed 26th Sess., 674th mtg. 1 31, U.N. Doc. EICN.6ISR.674
(1976). The debate on the measure made clear that a number of states objected to the idea
that the CEDAW might permit complaints against states for failures to observe the
convention, See id. 1 7 (Egypt); id 112 (Pakistan); id. 24 (Togo); id 1 25 (India); id. 29
(Thailand). The latter two states argued that the provision was unnecessary, as either the
group which became the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women
or the Commission on the Status of Women would be able to adequately supervise the
implementation of the CEDAW. This position implicitly assumed that such supervision was
the only remedy made available by the CEDAW unless the Belgian proposal was adopted.
Equally important, none of the states supporting the Belgian proposal countered that the
capacity to raise such complaints existed in any case, either as a general remedy under the
CEDAW or as a matter of customary law, id. 111-31. As was true with respect to the debate
over making Article 41 of the Covenant mandatory, so here: the debate makes sense only if
it was based on the assumption that neither the CEDAW itself nor customary law, as of 1976,
provided a basis for states to assert that other states had incurred international responsibility
for discriminating against women. Further, since the issue was apparently never raised again
in the course of the consideration of the CEDAW (see Report of the Working Group of the
Whole on the Drafting of the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women, U.N. GAOR, 3d Comm., 34th Sess., at 5-16, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/34/14 (1979)), there
is no evidence that any view of the matter different from that taken by the states represented
on the Commission on the Status of Women had come to the fore by the time the text of the
CEDAW was approved by the General Assembly in 1979.
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3. The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment
The CAT of 1984, as its name implies, addresses only a limited number
of human rights violations, those involving infliction of torture and other
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. 2 It differs from the Covenant, not
only in the narrowness of its focus, but also in the detail it devotes to the
human rights issue it addresses. Parties to it do not assume a mere general
obligation to refrain from torture; rather, they undertake specific obligations
to criminalize acts of torture, to train and oversee persons likely either to
encounter or to be tempted to engage in torture with a view toward
preventing the practice, to investigate complaints of torture, and to provide
redress for such acts perpetrated by their public officials. 33 Each party is
also required to enable itself under its own law either to extradite or to itself
exercise jurisdiction over persons alleged to have perpetrated acts of torture,
wherever such acts may have occurred and regardless of the nationality of
either the victim or the accused torturer.34
As was true of the substantive portions of the Covenant and the CEDAW,
the substantive provisions of the CAT leave no doubt that they are intended
to create obligations for the states parties. However, the relationship
between the CAT and customary international law is somewhat harder to
gauge than the similar relationship between the Covenant and customary
international law.
The very existence of the CAT, like that of the Covenant and the
CEDAW, has an impact on customary law. Specifically, it reinforces the
argument that torture is an appropriate subject of international concern. The
CAT goes beyond the Covenant, however, in requiring parties to establish
universal jurisdiction over torturers. The least one can say about this portion
of its text is that its drafters were prepared to consider torturers as criminals
in international law, in the same sense that pirates are. Even if this position
did not represent the drafters' view of the content of customary law as of
1984, such an approach surely has the potential, other things being equal, to
give rise to a new rule of customary international law, according to which
normal limitations to states' assertion of jurisdiction over non-nationals
would not apply in the case of torturers.
CAT, supra note 18, arts. 1-27.




As was also true of the Covenant and the CEDAW, however, the CAT,
properly interpreted, seems inconsistent with an argument that, as of the date
of its finalization, a state violating the terms of the treaty also violated
customary international law. Again, this conclusion is compelled by the
CAT's enforcement provisions. The CAT provides for the establishment of
a Committee Against Torture35 (Torture Committee), and gives the Torture
Committee four responsibilities. It is to review reports from state parties,
itself carry out investigations upon receiving "reliable information containing
well-founded indications that torture is being systematically practised" within
a party's territory, and investigate communications from state parties and
individuals that states parties are violating their obligations under the
CAT.' While the requirement that parties submit reports is mandatory, all
the other implementation mechanisms are optional.37
The same arguments made with respect to similar provisions of the
Covenant apply to the CAT. Provisions making optional a state's subjection
to treaty procedures intended to enforce an obligation to prevent torture make
no sense if states would in any case have parallel rights under customary law
to make claims against other states perpetrating acts of torture. The CAT's
inclusion of such provisions, then, implies that the drafting states did not
believe that such a right existed under customary law as of 1984."s
35 d. arts. 17-18.
36 M arts. 19-22.
'7 Id. arts. 19-22, 28. The CAT differs from the Covenant in one respect, in that, while
states must opt in to the interstate and individual complaint procedures, as is true under Art.
41 of the Covenant and under the First Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 302, states wishing to avoid the
authority of the Committee Against Torture to conduct its own investigations must opt out.
3' As was true of the Covenant, the negotiating history of the CAT reinforces this
conclusion. The draft text was presented by the Human Rights Commission to the General
Assembly in a form that made clear that the full Commission had not sought to resolve
controversies existing regarding certain of the CAT's provisions (the controversial provisions
were included in the draft but enclosed in square brackets). Specifically, controversy existed
regarding Arts. 19 and 20. Under the draft Convention, the Committee Against Torture
would, in reviewing the reports required by Art. 19, have had the authority to make
"suggestions" to states. This was seen as objectionable as permitting the Committee to, in
effect, evaluate state compliance with the CAT. Draft Art. 20 was seen as raising a problem
in that it made submission to the Committee's investigatory authority mandatory. Both
socialist states and members of the non-aligned movement complained that these provisions
permitted the Committee to interfere in their internal affairs, and objected to them. Further,
a number of states expressed the fear that inclusion in the Convention of the provisions in
question could dissuade some states from becoming parties to it. Ultimately, the Third
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Further, as was true under the Covenant and the CEDAW, the limited
character of the undertakings under the CAT meant that practice in accord
with the plan of that instrument would not give rise to a rule of customary
international law in future. Again, this is not to say practice under the CAT
in operation could not have diverged from that envisioned at the drafting
stage, and thus have given rise to a rule.39 It is only to say that adherence
to a treaty scheme which excludes enforcement of the obligations the treaty
creates cannot give rise to a customary legal rule as to those same obliga-
tions, since, as explained above, that concept of "legal" obligation assumes
that the obligation in question is enforceable.
Committee deleted the authority of the Committee Against Torture to make "suggestions" and
adopted a Bulgarian amendment adding to the CAT Art. 28, which permits states to opt out
of Art. 20's grant of investigative authority to the Torture Committee. U.N. GAOR, 3d
Comm., 39th Sess., mtgs. 48-52, 60, U.N. Docs. A/C.3/39/SR.48 - A/C.3/39/SR.52,
A/C.3/39/SR.60 (1984); J. HERMAN BURGERS & HANS DANELIUs, THE UNrrED NATIONS
CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE: A HANDBOOK ON THE CONVENnON AGAINST TORTURE
AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT 96-107, 236-49
(1988). As was true with the debates over the Covenant, those over the CAT make sense
only if the parties assumed that there were no mandatory international legal enforcement
mechanisms relating to torture. Even under the mandatory version of Art. 20, for example,
the Committee Against Torture was authorized at most to investigate, make findings, transmit
those findings to the state concerned together with comments and suggestions, and at its
discretion, to include a summary account of the proceeding in its Annual Report. It seems
unlikely that states would trouble themselves to oppose such a provision if they saw
themselves as vulnerable in any case to claims by other states based on a violation of a
customary law rule against torture. Further, supporters of the mandatory system did not argue
that it was a limited measure, in light of the availability of claims based either on the CAT
itself or on customary rules against torture; on the contrary, they argued that without the
Human Rights Commission's version of Arts. 19 and 20, the CAT would become a "voluntary
commitment" (Belgium), U.N. GAOR, 3d Comm., 39th Sess., 49th mtg., U.N. Doc.
A/C.3/39/SR.49, at 10 (1984), and that without those provisions, the text has "no more than
face value" (Spain), U.N. GAOR, 3d Comm., 39th Sess., 52d mtg., U.N. Doc. A/C.3/39/SR.52
at 4 (1984).
" For example, even though the CAT makes no provision for enforcing its requirement
that states exercise universal jurisdiction over torturers, the practice of claiming such
jurisdiction could become so widespread and uncontroversial that it could be deemed
permitted by customary international law.
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C. Patterns of Adherence
1. Introduction
Patterns of adherence to human rights treaties are relevant to their status
as customary international law for several reasons. First, ratification
presumably represents at least some form of acceptance of the rules a treaty
embodies; conversely, a refusal to ratify is consistent with the possibility that
nonratifying states do not accept some aspect of the treaty. Relatively
limited participation in a treaty thus raises a question regarding the
customary law status of a treaty's rules,' since limited participation
supports doubts as to the "general" character of the acceptance of the norms
in question. This would be particularly true of human rights treaties, since
their subject matter is not such as to leave some states with "no interest in
becoming parties .... "'
Second, given the optional character of the implementation provisions of
the Covenant and the CAT, adherence to those provisions in particular sheds
light on states' willingness to be held accountable for their breaches of
human rights treaties. As pointed out above, one of the hall-marks of a legal
rule is its enforceable character; an indication that particular states are
unwilling to have the provisions of human rights treaties enforced against
them, then, casts doubt on those states' acceptance of the treaties' rules as
matters of customary law.
Finally, analysis of reservations to human rights treaties is for two reasons
useful in determining the content of customary international law. First, such
analysis throws light on the limitations of the obligation which the reserving
state is willing to accept. Even a reservation which is impermissible under
a particular treaty42 will be useful for determining the content of customary
law, since at minimum such a reservation suggests that the reserving state's
future behavior will not be what might be expected if expectations were
based solely on the text of the treaty in question. And, as pointed out above,
treaties are relevant to customary international law only insofar as they aid
in predicting future behavior.
The second useful aspect of reservations is the light they may throw on
the views of non-reserving states. It could be argued that parties to a treaty
40 North Sea Case, 1969 I.C.J. 3, 1 73.
41 Id.
42 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 27, art. 19.
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who do not object to a reservation presumably do not find the reservation
objectionable; in other words, such non-objecting parties would presumably
be prepared to acquiesce in behavior by the reserving state that was
consistent with the reservation. Such an argument, however, surely goes too
far. All parties will not pay especially close attention to the reservations
made to a multilateral treaty. Further, some may accept Bowett's distinction
between "permissibility" and "opposability" of reservations, 3 and see no
need to object to reservations which, because of impermissibility, would be
ineffective in any case.' Finally, when a reservation has evoked objections
from some states, other states which find the reservation objectionable may
see no point in adding to the list of objecting states, since additional
objections would make no legal difference. For all these reasons, the
implications of a state's failure to object to a treaty reservation are too
ambiguous to support any firm conclusions. It would seem, however,
reasonable to note that such a failure is ambiguous, and that one possible
explanation is that non-objecting states in fact do not find the reservation
objectionable. In other words, while a state's failure to object to a
reservation to a treaty to which it is a party certainly does not demonstrate
its acquiescence in that reservation, the failure leaves murky the non-object-
ing state's attitude toward the reservation, and by extension, toward behavior
by the reserving state consistent with that reservation.
The discussion that follows, then, considers these aspects of patterns of
adherence to the three human rights treaties addressed in this paper.
2. The Covenant
Although the Covenant has been open for adherence for about 26 years,
as of July 29, 1994, the parties to it numbered only 127, one of which
(Switzerland) is not a member of the United Nations.4' As the United
Nations currently includes 185 states,' this means that about one-third of
the states of the world have not become parties to the Covenant. Further, the
' D. Bowett, Reservations to Non-Restricted Multilateral Treaties, 48 BRrT. Y.B.I.L. 67,
88-90 (1976-77).
" Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 27, art. 19.
4S Report of the Human Rights Comm., Vol. 1, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at
89 (1994) [hereinafter Human Rights Comm Report].
46 Membership of Principal United Nations Organizations in 1995, 32 U.N. MoNTH.
CHRON. (Mar. 1995), at inside back cover.
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non-adherents include a significant number of Muslim states,' as well as
about half the states of East Asia.4" These circumstances support doubts as
to the generality of the acceptability of the Covenant's provisions, and thus
of their status as customary law.
This impression is reinforced by a consideration of the pattern of
acceptances of the Human Rights Committee's authority under Article 41
and of adherence to the First Optional Protocol to the Covenant.49 Only 44
states, as of July 29, 1994, had made declarations under Article 41, 32 of
those being either European or primarily inhabited by descendants of
Europeans. ' Seventy-seven states were parties to the First Optional
Protocol as of that date, 38 of whom had also made declarations under
Article 41.51 Not quite half of the 77 are European or European-settled
states, with the balance divided approximately evenly between Caribbean and
Latin American states and African states; very few Asian states have become
parties to the First Optional Protocol.5 2 In other words, fewer than half the
states of the world have been willing to agree to any measure of implement-
ing the Covenant that could lead to their being called to account for specific
violations of the Covenant. Asian parties in particular seem reluctant to
accept one or the other of the "communication" procedures.53 Given the
large number of important Asian states who have refused to adhere to the
Covenant at all, this circumstance necessarily raises questions about Asian
perceptions as to the customary legal character of the Covenant's provisions.
Consideration of reservations adds little to our understanding of the
parties' attitudes toward the Covenant. Twenty-four states have made
47 Of the states of the Arabian peninsula, only Yemen is a party to the Covenant. Other
non-parties with significant Muslim populations include Bangladesh, Chad, Indonesia,
Mauritania, Turkey and Pakistan. 1994 Human Rights Comm. Report, supra note 45, at 89-
92.
' East Asian non-parties include Brunei, China, Indonesia (also counted among the
Muslim states), Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Singapore and Thailand. Id.
49 First Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
supra note 37, at 302.
o 1994 Human Rights Comm. Report, supra note 45, at 94-95.
sI Id. at 92-94.
52 Id.
3 Id. at 92-95.
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significant substantive reservations, but these are generally limited in
scope.
54
Overall, however, patterns of adherence provide only weak support for the
proposition that the Covenant represents customary international law.
One-third of the states of the world, including significant groupings of states,
are not parties. And over one-third of the parties to the Covenant have
refused to expose themselves to international accountability for breaches of
it.
3. The CEDAW
One hundred thirty-two states had become parties to the CEDAW as of
February 4, 1994." This represents about 70% of the states of the world.
A number of states with significant Muslim populations have not become
parties, however.'e Moreover, the significance for customary law of the
number of adherents to the CEDAW is somewhat dissipated by the large
number of significant reservations which states have made to the Conven-
tion.5 7 Sixteen parties, including almost all of the predominantly Muslim
parties, have made reservations that would appear to markedly limit their
actual acceptance of the principles of the CEDAW. 8 Given the sweeping
character of many of these reservations, it is somewhat surprising that they
s' Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General: Status as at December 31,
1993, at 125-33, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/12 (1994) [hereinafter 1993 Multilateral Treaties].
The most common reservations reject any absolute obligation to segregate juvenile from adult
prisoners, and qualify the undertaking in the Covenant to ban war propaganda. Id.
S Report of the Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, U.N.
GAOR, 49th Sess., at 154-56, U.N. Doc. A/49/38 (1994) [hereinafter U.N. Doc. A/49/38].
s Afghanistan, Chad, Iran, Mauritania, Pakistan, Syria and Saudi Arabia are among the
non-parties; indeed, no state of the Arabian peninsula except Yemen has become a party to
the CEDAW. Id.
" For a detailed discussion of reservations to the CEDAW, see Rebecca J. Cook,
Reservations to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, 30 VA. J. INT'L. L. 643 (1990).
' For example, Bangladesh, Egypt, Libya, the Maldives and Morocco all qualify their
acceptance of the Covenant by subordinating it to Islamic law. Iraq, Jordan, Tunisia, and
Turkey, while not referring to Islamic law in their reservations, nonetheless refuse to accept
significant substantive elements of the CEDAW, particularly provisions relating to gender
equality in marriage. Brazil, Jamaica, India, Israel, the Republic of Korea, Mauritius, and
Thailand have also made reservations that could seriously limit the effect of the Covenant in
at least some particulars. 1993 Multilateral Treaties, supra note 54, at 167-75.
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have evoked relatively few objections from the parties to the treaty. In no
case have as many as eight parties objected to a reservation; in most cases,
the same four parties have interposed objections.59 Furthermore, none of
the objecting states have asserted, in its objection, that the Convention is not
in force between the reserving and objecting state because of the reservation.
On the contrary, several have explicitly stated that their objection does not
preclude the entry into force of the treaty between the objecting and the
reserving states.'" Others, though using language in their objections
strongly implying that they see the reservations to which they object as
effectively nullifying the reserving states' adherence to the Convention, have
not made this conclusion explicit.6
Taken together, these reservations appear to weaken any argument that the
CEDAW represents customary international law. As noted above, their
effect is, in many cases, to greatly limit the obligations state purport to
assume under the convention. That is, one seeking to predict the future
behavior of the reserving states with respect to the subjects addressed by the
CEDAW would be forced to conclude that they would ignore rather than
obey the treaty in some sets of circumstances. Thus, to the extent that one's
expectations were based on the CEDAW, the number of states that one could
plausibly expect to behave as though they regarded discrimination against
women as a violation of international law would not be 132, but 116. This
amounts to about 64% of the membership of the United Nations, which
seems too small a proportion upon which to base claims of a general
practice.
This conclusion is reinforced by the lack of reaction to the reservations by
other parties to the CEDAW. State objections to reservations under that
instrument are especially important, since they are the principal means of
raising questions regarding the permissibility of reservations; the Committee
lacks authority to compel states to abandon even impermissible reserva-
tions.62 As noted above, failures to object to reservations are ambiguous
indicators of states' attitudes toward those reservations. In this case,
" Far and away the most frequent objectors are Germany, Mexico, the Netherlands, and
Sweden. These four were joined by Denmark, Finland and Norway in objecting to Libya's
reservation. Id. at 175-77.
60 Id
61 Id.
62 Report of the Comm. on Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, U.N. GAOR,
39th Sess., pt. 2, Annex 3, at 55, U.N. Doc. A139/45 (1984).
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however, given the large number of parties to the CEDAW and the
questionable compatibility of many of the reservations with the treaty, it is
surprising that so few states have raised objections. Further, the limited
character of the objections which have been made suggests that even the
objecting states are reluctant to squarely insist upon good faith adherence to
the treaty. This conclusion seems compelled by the facts that most of the
objectors expressly state that their objections do not preclude the entry into
force of the treaty between themselves and the reserving states, and that none
of the objectors declare the treaty not in force between themselves and the
reserving states. At least it would appear that anyone contending that the
CEDAW represented customary international law would need to explain such
relatively tepid reactions to some very doubtful reservations.
4. The CAT
The pattern of adherence to the CAT likewise lends only weak support to
the proposition that it is customary international law. It has been available
for adherence for ten years, but only 96 states have become parties.63
Almost all have refrained from opting out of the jurisdiction of the Torture
Committee to investigate allegations of torture on its own motion; however,
only 36 have agreed to one or the other of the complaint procedures the
CAT provides, and 29 of the 36 are either European or primarily inhabited
by the descendants of Europeans." There have been no significant
reservations to the CAT.
This pattern of adherence would not appear to support the proposition that
torture at a state's behest is a violation of customary international law. A
convention to which barely half the members of the U.N. are willing to
adhere seems a poor indication of the general practice of states. This
conclusion is reinforced by the reluctance of the states which have become
parties to be held accountable for breaches of the Convention. While, as
noted above, almost all are subject to the investigative jurisdiction of the
Torture Committee, those investigations may be triggered only as to
allegations of the systematic practice of torture.65 Most of the parties are
unwilling to be compelled to address claims regarding torture that could not
63 Report of the Committee Against Torture, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 44 at 30-
32, U.N. Doc. A/49/44 (1994) [hereinafter 1994 Torture Comm. Report].
65 CAT, supra note 18, art. 20.
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be called systematic. In short, state reaction to the CAT tends if anything
to reinforce the impression that states generally are unwilling to accept legal
obligations to respect human rights.
D. Practice Under Human Rights Treaties
This portion of the discussion addresses the effect of practice under human
rights treaties on the customary law status of the rules those treaties set forth.
Preliminarily, it is important to make clear what "practice" is being
addressed here. Obviously, from the point of view of the primary beneficia-
ries of human rights norms-the mass of people of the world-the most
important issue with respect to practice is, do states respect human rights or
do they not? Similarly, the actual practice of states with respect to
protection of human rights is presumably the crucial determinant of the
existence of a customary law of human rights.' And there seems to be
little disagreement with the proposition that a large number of states
systematically flout even the most basic norms of human rights. The reports
of Amnesty International, for example, compel this conclusion.67 Similarly,
Professor Opsahl, writing in late 1991, estimated that the Covenant had had
"only a marginal impact in perhaps one-third of the ninety-six States
Parties." On this basis, then, it is difficult to maintain the proposition that
the actual practice of states supports the view that there is any very extensive
customary international law of human rights.
It is not this aspect of practice under human rights treaties, however, that
this discussion proposes to address. Rather, the object in this portion of this
paper is to examine the behavior of the states parties to human rights treaties
with respect to matters relevant to such treaties but not in the first instance
involving the substantive rights the treaties purport to protect. The
discussion then seeks to determine what inferences this behavior suggests
concerning the extra-treaty legal status of the rules of such treaties. (Most
of the remarks that follow will necessarily focus on the Covenant, given the
length of time it has been in effect and the greater opportunity for practice
to develop with respect to it).
"For a discussion of this point, see Weisburd, supra note 12. For a discussion reaching
a similar conclusion, see Simma & Alston, supra note 8, at 90-100.
67 See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, REPORT 1993 (1993).
"Torkel Opsahl, The Human Rights Committee, in PHILIP ALSTON, THE UNITED NATIONS
AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A CRmCAL APPRAIsAL 369, 436 (1992).
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What then does practice, in the above-described sense, tell us about the
customary legal status of the rules of human rights treaties? First, the
background of the CEDAW and CAT raises questions as to the customary
legal status of the rules of the Covenant as of 1979 and 1984. As noted
above, the negotiating histories of those instruments cast doubt on the
proposition that the prohibitions against discrimination against women and
against torture had entered customary international law as of 1979 and 1984,
respectively.' Yet both prohibitions are contained in the Covenant.70 The
debates on those instruments, that is, necessarily reflect states' views as to
the customary law status of some of the Covenant's articles, and indicate
that, at the time the treaties were opened for signature, states did not see
those articles, at least, as having given rise to a right in states to invoke other
states' international responsibility if the latter had engaged in conduct
violating those articles.
Doubts as to the customary law character of the rights listed in the
Covenant also receive some reinforcement from the lack of use of the
inter-state complaint procedure of Article 41. That procedure is simply not
used.7 ' To be sure, as noted above, relatively few states have subjected
themselves to the Human Rights Committee's authority with respect to this
procedure. Further, most of those who have are parties to the European
Convention on Human Rights, and rely on that treaty's enforcement
mechanisms with respect to one another.72 But not all the states who have
brought themselves under Article 41 are European, and not all have
unblemished human rights records. Further, any state against whom a
complaint might be made would necessarily have agreed in advance to
subject itself to this procedure, presumably reducing the political risk to the
complaining state. It is therefore noteworthy that Article 41 remains, in
Professor Opsahl's phrase, a "hypothetical function" of the Human Rights
Committee." This non-use suggests, once again, a reluctance on the part
of states to hold one another responsible for violations of human rights,
which in turn seems inconsistent with an argument that human rights norms
are matters of law, that is, rules to be enforced against violators.
6See supra notes 28-39, and accompanying text.
70 Covenant, supra note 16, arts. 3, 7, 26.
71 Opsahl, supra note 68, at 419-20.
3 Id. at 420.
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A third and related observation is that, as a matter of fact, states objecting
to actions by other states which would be violations of customary law if the
standards of human rights treaties have entered customary law apparently do
not usually label such actions illegal, at least when the objecting state's own
nationals are not involved; rather, objecting states characterize their
intercessions as motivated by humanitarian considerations.7 4 Indeed, this
seems to be the case even when the allegedly offending state is bound by an
arguably relevant human rights treaty." This pattern reinforces the
impression that parties to human rights treaties do not see those treaties as
enforceable except through such implementation measures as the treaty may
include; it amounts to "subsequent practice ... which establishes the
agreement of the parties regarding [the human rights treaties'] interpreta-
tion. Moreover, it also supports doubts as to the customary legal status
of the norms set out in those treaties. To be sure, as Kamminga has
observed, such reticence may reflect only a tactical judgment by an objecting
state that, in a particular case, it would be more likely to succeed in aiding
the person or persons it sought to assist by characterizing its action as a
matter of humanitarian interest, as opposed to the invocation of a legal
duty." It would therefore go too far to assert that such evidence of actual
state practice compels the conclusion that states do not, in practice, consider
violations of putative human rights norms to be violations of customary
international law. What can be said, however, is that the failure of objecting
states to invoke customary international law in such circumstances suggests
some uneasiness about relying upon that body of law as a basis for an
approach to another state regarding human rights violations. That is, it
suggests some state ambiguity on the actual legal character of human rights
norms. Moreover, it would seem uncontroversial that states would reinforce
the customary legal character of human rights norms if they invoked that
legal character in their objections to actions by other states. Their failure to
do so thus not only casts some doubt on such norms' legal status, but
suggests limited interest on the part of objecting states in reinforcing that
legal status.
74 MENNo T. KAMMINGA, INTER-STATE ACCOUNTABILITY FOR VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN
RIGHTs 25-62 (1992).
75 a
76 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 27, art. 31.3(b).
7 KAMMINGA, supra note 74, at 33-34, 58.
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A fourth relevant point concerns states' reactions to their own human
rights violations. Under both the Covenant 8 and the CAT,79 parties are
obliged to provide redress to persons injured by violations of the rights
guaranteed in those instruments. There is, however, considerable reason to
doubt whether such redress is in fact provided. Thus Special Rapporteur van
Boven, charged by the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and
Protection of Minorities with carrying out a study "concerning the right to
restitution, compensation and rehabilitation for victims of gross violations of
human rights and fundamental freedoms,"' concluded:
It is clear from the present study that only scarce or margin-
al attention is given to the issue of redress and reparation to
the victims. The disregard of the rights of the victims is
also pointed out by United Nations rapporteurs and working
groups that deal with consistent patterns of gross violations
of human rights. For example, the Special Rapporteur on
extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions recently stated
that with regard to compensation granted to the families of
victims of extrajudicia, summary or arbitrary executions,
only one Government had reported to him that indemnifica-
tion was being provided to the families.8' (footnoted omit-
ted)
This issue has raised concern even with respect to compliance with the
"views" expressed by the Human Rights Committee in response to
individuals' complaints of violations of the Covenant under the procedure
established by the First Optional Protocol. Since adherence to the First
Optional Protocol is purely voluntary, it might be assumed that the 77 states
which have in fact adhered to it would conform to the Human Rights
Committee's views as a matter of course. In fact, that Committee became
disturbed enough about the level of compliance with its "views" in such
7 Covenant, supra note 16, art. 2(3).
79CAT, supra note 18, art. 14.
80 Study Concerning the Right to Restitution, Compensation and Rehabilitation for Victims
of Gross Violations of Hwnan Rights and Fundamental Freedoms: Final Report Submitted
by Mr. Theo van Boven, Special Rapporteur, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., 1 1, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/8 (1993).
"I Id. [ 132.
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cases to appoint a special rapporteur to address the matter.8 2 The Commit-
tee has expressed views in 193 cases, finding violations of the Covenant in
142. 3 The Special Rapporteur sought follow-up information regarding 120
of these cases, receiving it in only 65. 4 Furthermore, the Committee
observed that "a little more than one-fourth of the replies" were "fully
satisfactory," while "[a] little over one-third ... cannot be considered
satisfactory."' The Committee was sufficiently concerned by this situation
to decide to give extensive publicity to whatever information it could obtain
regarding implementation of its views. 6
A final element of practice relevant to this study concerns state compli-
ance with such implementation obligations as existing human rights treaties
include. The one such obligation common to all three treaties here discussed
and mandatory for all parties is that of reporting. Yet states commonly
neglect their reporting obligations. A study carried out by Professor Alston
at the request of the General Assembly demonstrates that at least half the
parties to each of the three conventions discussed in this paper are behind in
their reporting obligations; several defaulters owe more than one report.8 7
As he points out, in a climate of toleration of non-reporting,
Government officials may justifiably come to assume that
ratification or accession to a human rights treaty is an act
that brings much sought after kudos but is otherwise of little
consequence. The standards contained in the treaty are
82 Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 40 at 173-
74, U.N. Doc. A/46/40 (1992).
'3 1994 Human Rights Comm. Report, supra note 45, at 84.
4 id.
8 Id.
s Id. at 85-86.
Status of Preparation of Publications, Studies and Documents for the World
Conference: Effective Implementation of International Instruments on Human Rights,
Including Reporting Obligations Under International Conventions on Human Rights, World
Conference on Human Rights Preparatory Committee, 4th Sess., 1104, Table 1, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 157/PC/62/Add.l /Rev. 1 (1993) [hereinafter Effective Implementation of Human
Rights Instruments].
The situation reported by Alston continues. As of July 29, 1994, a total of 96 reports from
75 parties to the Covenant were overdue. 1994 Human Rights Comm. Report, supra note 45,
atl 53, p. 12. Seventy-two states owe 108 reports under CEDAW, U.N. Doc. A/49/38, supra
note 55, at 161-74, and 39 states owe reports under CAT, 1994 Torture Comm. Report, supra
note 63, at 34-38.
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unlikely to be taken seriously in the context of domestic law
and policy-making if the obligation to report to the treaty
body, which in many respects is one of the less onerous
implications of becoming a party, is ignored. Finally, any
fears on the part of nongovernmental organizations or of
political and other interest groups that the treaty system is
toothless and even irrelevant are reinforced. 8
One may fairly ask whether the lax attitude toward the reporting obligation
which Professor Alston details would not all ready support the conclusions
which he suggests.
It should also be noted that the impression that states do not take human
rights treaty regimes very seriously is reinforced by their collective failure
to provide anything approaching adequate administrative and financial
support to the bodies charging with overseeing implementation of those
treaties. Professor Alston's report makes clear how strapped for resources
those bodies are.89 Indeed, he observes with respect to the meeting time
allocated to the treaty bodies, ". . . that many of the treaty bodies are only
able to function within their existing allocations of meeting time because of
the enormous rate of overdue and unsubmitted reports, and because they are
devoting a clearly inadequate amount of time to the consideration of each
report."'  Obviously, states' failures to meet their reporting obligations
under human rights treaties and to provide to treaty implementation bodies
resources adequate to their task amount to the undercutting of such
enforcement of those treaties as may exist, and thus reinforce the conclusion
that states generally do not see the obligations in those treaties as enforce-
able. That conclusion is equivalent to the determination that states do not
see the rules of those treaties as matters of law.
E. Human Rights Treaties and Customary Law: Conclusion
The foregoing discussion examines three aspects of three human rights
treaty regimes to determine whether any of them would support a prediction
that the "obey or be sanctioned" standard would be applied to violations of
the rights the treaty purports to protect. The only possible conclusion is that





none of them do. As to each, the text-while certainly supporting the
proposition that human rights questions are not pure matters of states'
domestic jurisdiction-cuts against any argument that violations of human
rights give rise to international responsibility.
Patterns of adherence to such treaties likewise raise doubts as to their
effect on customary law. In part, this conclusion flows from states' failures
to subject themselves to enforcement procedures when they are available.
In part, it depends on the relatively limited adherence to such treaties and,
equally important, the particularly low levels of adherence by identifiable
groups of states. And as to the CEDAW, it is reinforced by the apparent
tolerance by most parties of reservations to the treaty which seem clearly
contrary to its object and purpose.
Finally, practice under the treaties reinforces doubts as to their status as
customary law. This practice includes, to be sure, the flouting of human
rights norms by many parties to these treaties, but is not limited to such
behavior. It includes as well the attitudes of states negotiating treaties which
elaborated upon rights all ready supposedly protected by the Covenant,
states' failures either to use such enforcement procedures as human rights
treaties make available or to claim a legal basis for complaints as to human
rights violations by other states, states' failures to redress their own
violations of human rights, and the apparently widespread lack of interest
either in complying with the reporting obligations created by human rights
treaties or in supporting treaty-created monitoring bodies at a realistic level.
Arguably, no one of these factors in isolation is inconsistent with the
existence of a general acceptance by states of the "obey or be sanctioned"
character of international human rights norms. Taken together, however,
they seem to demonstrate that human rights treaty regimes do not support the
proposition that states accept the enforceable, which is to say the legal,
character of human rights norms.
V. OTHER FoRMAL INTERNATIONAL ACTS RELEVANT
To THIS DISCUSSION
Discussions of the customary international law of human rights very
frequently place weight on more or less formal acts by groups of states
which, though not taking the form of instruments creating legal obligations
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to respect human rights, nonetheless address human rights questions.91 In
this spirit, this portion of this paper will consider the implications for this
area of customary law of certain recent formal international acts which have
implications for human rights.
First on the list, because it has a legal effect although it purports to create
no obligations to respect human rights, is the General Assembly's creation
of the post of High Commissioner for Human Rights.' The resolution
creating that position is interesting in a number of respects. First, it nowhere
declares human rights obligations to be matters of international law; it
characterizes the "promotion and protection of all human rights" as "a
legitimate concern of the international community"" in a context in which
one might have expected a reference to international law, if human rights
norms are in fact seen as extra-treaty legal norms. The closest the resolution
comes to recognizing a legal obligation in this regard is its characterization
of "promot[ion] and protect[ion] of all human rights and fundamental
freedoms" as a "duty", type unspecified.?
A second interesting aspect of the resolution is that the right to which it
seems to give most prominence is the right to development."5 This is
significant because at least some scholars would seem to see respect for that
right as precluding actions that might otherwise be logical mechanisms for
enforcing human rights obligations, such as economic pressures.9
Recognizing a right to development thus may in practice weaken protections
for other rights.
Finally, the new High Commissioner's authority is ambiguous and would
not appear to extend to enforcement measures. Thus, the resolution provides
that the High Commissioner shall "function within a framework" that couples
the obligation "to promote the universal respect for and observance of all
human rights" with the obligation "to respect the sovereignty, territorial
' For example, the number of discussions of this issue which refer to the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights is too numerous to recount; but it is uncontroversial that that
instrument was not intended to be legally binding at the time of its adoption. Antonio
Cassese, The General Assembly: Historical Perspective, in ALSTON, supra note 68, at 25, 31.
' G.A. Res. 48/141, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/141 (1994)
[hereinafter Res. 48/141].
93 Id 3(a).
94 Id. I 3(b).
9 Id. paras. 4,6 and I 3(c) and 4(c).
9 Omer Y. Elagab, Coercive Economic Measures Against Developing Countries, 41 INT'L
& CoMP. L.Q. 682, 694 n.33 (1992).
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integrity and domestic jurisdiction of States."'  Similarly, the only
provision expressly addressing the High Commissioner's dealings with states
is that which gives him/her the responsibility "[tlo engage in a dialogue with
all governments in the implementation of his/her mandate with a view to
securing respect for all human rights."9' All in all, it would not appear that
the High Commissioner for Human Rights is seen as an enforcer of law.
A second relevant recent formal act was taken by the World Conference
on Human Rights, convened by the United Nations in Vienna in June,
199399 when it adopted its Vienna Declaration and Programme of Ac-
tion"E° (Vienna Declaration). That instrument declares that "Respect for
human rights and for fundamental freedoms without distinction of any kind
is a fundamental rule of international human rights law."' ' The impact of
this unequivocal statement, however, is somewhat lessened by the absence
from the Vienna Declaration of any express reference to enforcement of
human rights obligations. Indeed, the statement quoted above is preceded
by one to the effect that "States should eliminate all violations of human
rights and their causes . . .""0 (emphasis supplied) and followed two
sentences later by the statement that "Governments should take effective
measures to prevent and combat [all forms of racism and racial discrimina-
tion, xenophobia and related intolerance]' 3 (emphasis supplied). The use
of "should" in these contexts creates a certain ambiguity. Further, the
Vienna Declaration places considerable weight on the right to develop-
ment,' O° which can pose a quandary for human rights enforcement, as
noted above. Finally, the Vienna Declaration qualifies somewhat its
affirmation of the universal character of human rights by observing that "the
significance of national and regional particularities and various historical,
cultural and religious backgrounds must be borne in mind"."°  This
language likewise creates ambiguities, since bearing such factors in mind
"Res. 48/141, supra note 92, 1 3(a).
" Id. I 4(g).
99 United Nations World Conference on Human Rights: Vienna Declaration and
Programme of Action, June 25, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1661 (1993).
'00 U.N. GAOR, World Conference on Human Rights, pt. 1 TI 20-46, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.157/24 (1993).
10 Id. § I, 15.
102Id. § I, 9[ 13.
103 Id. § 1, 1 15.
104 Id. § I, TI 10-12.
10- Id. § I, 5.
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could lead to the conclusion that there can be agreement on human rights
norms only so at abstract a level as to preclude the creation of enforceable
international legal rules.
The Vienna Declaration's ambiguity is reinforced when consideration is
given to certain of the declarations adopted by states of particular regions in
preparation for the World Conference. In the Tunis Declaration,'0 6 42
African states took positions which seem to cast doubt on their agreement
with the proposition that human rights obligations are enforceable against
governments under customary international law. Aside from their assertion
that "[t]he right to development is inalienable,"1" which raises problems
for the reasons all ready discussed, they assert: "Respect for human rights
is undeniably a matter of international concern. No preconceived model,
however, can be prescribed on a universal scale. The promotion of human
rights in the world is a goal to the attainment of which all States, without
exception, are called upon to contribute' 'lcu (emphasis supplied) Obvious-
ly, to label promotion of human rights as a "goal" is to use language which
is hard to reconcile with a concept of legal obligation.
Even more at odds with a view of human rights as imposing international
legal obligations is the Bangkok Declaration,'" adopted by 34 Asian states.
The parties to it "discourage[dJ" making development aid conditional on
human rights questions,10 "[eJmphasize[dJ the principles of respect for
national sovereignty and territorial integrity as well as non-interference in the
internal affairs of States, and the non-use of human rights as an instrument
of political pressure""' and "[r]eiterate[d] that all countries, large and
small, have the right to determine their political systems, control and freely
utilize their resources, and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural
development.""' 2 They further asserted that, "while human rights are
universal in nature, they must be considered in the context of a dynamic and
evolving process of international norm-setting, bearing in mind the
significance of national and regional particularities and various historical,
106 Report of the Regional Meeting for Africa of the World Conference on Human Rights,
U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess. at 1-3, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157.AFRM/14 (1992).
107 Id. 8.
logId. 5.
'09 Report of the Regional Meeting for Asia of the World Conference on Human Rights,
U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess. at 3-7, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/ASRM/8 (1993).
"1
0 Id. 1 4.




cultural and religious backgrounds.""' 3 Finally, they too give great weight
to the right to development. 14
It is true, of course, that these regional declarations predate the Vienna
Declaration. It could be argued therefore, that-to the extent that they
suggest either qualifications on the belief in universal human rights standards
or opposition to the concept of the enforceability of human rights
norms-they have been rendered irrelevant by that instrument. This
argument seems doubtful, however, since there is reason to question whether
states were led to alter their position on these questions by the World
Conference. For example, the Interparliamentary Organization of the
Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), adopted the Kuala
Lumpur Declaration1 5 in September, 1993,16 well after the conclusion
of the World Conference. That instrument includes provisions which are
very hard to reconcile with a view of human rights norms as creating
internationally enforceable legal obligations. For example, it provides,
"[e]ach member state has the right to development based on its own
objectives, to set its own priorities, and to decide the ways and means of
realizing its development without external interference."'1 7 Further, it
asserts that "[u]niversal promotion and protection of human rights should
take place in the context of international cooperation based on respect for
national sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference in the internal
affairs of states, and human rights should not be used as a conditionality for
economic cooperation and development assistance.""' It lays exceptional-
ly heavy stress on the right to development. 9 It also omits from its list
of rights some which are generally recognized in other international and
regional human rights instruments,1 ° and qualifies other commonly
recognized rights. 21  All in all, the Kuala Lumpur Declaration would
113 Id. 1 8.
114 Id. para. 11, 1 17-19.
'"See Appendix [hereinafter Kuala Lumpur Declaration].1 6ASEAN Lawmakers Want Mechanism to Check Rights Abuses, KYODO NEWS SERVICE,
Sept. 24, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Allworld File.
17 Kuala Lumpur Declaration, supra note 115, art. 4.
8 Id. art. 5.
139 Id. arts. 16-19.
32 It does not expressly address the right to be free from torture, for example. Id.
121 In Article 1 it insists on a balance between the rights of the individual and those of
the community, while in Articles 7, 9, 12 and 13 it in effect permits interference with certain
rights if done in accordance with law. Id.
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appear to be strikingly forthright both in its rejection of any international
enforcement of human rights norms and in its adoption of a scale of
priorities of human rights which is inconsistent with such enforcement.
Taken together, these recent formal acts tend to support the view derived
from a consideration of human rights treaties. That is, there is little
opposition to the concept that human rights are a matter of international
concern. However, when confronted with the question of enforcement of
human rights, states often respond either by evading the question or by
taking positions squarely inconsistent with such enforcement. And, as
observed repeatedly, in this paper, norms that are not properly enforceable
in a legal system are not rules of that system.
VI. FINAL THOUGHTS
Adding all of this together, it would appear that evidence does not support
the proposition that states generally are prepared to acknowledge that human
rights norms are internationally enforceable. If that is true, then labelling
such norms rules of customary law would appear to be a contradiction in
terms. That is, in any event, the position this paper takes.
But a more basic issue presents itself. What difference does it make
whether human rights norms can be characterized as rules of law? That
question turns out to be surprisingly hard to answer.
Of course, it would make a very great difference indeed if human rights
questions were seen as purely matters of domestic jurisdiction. If that were
true, then it would be impossible even for states to expostulate with one
another regarding human rights issues. But this is clearly not the case.
Aside from the effect created by the treaties discussed in this paper, state
practice clearly demonstrates that states in practice acknowledge in one
another a right to comment on one another's behavior with respect to human
rights. 22
It would also make a difference if states sought to impose sanctions on
human rights violators which took the form of reprisals, that is, otherwise
unlawful actions justified only as a response to a preceding unlawful action
by the target of the reprisal."n This is rarely the case, however; most
states who react to human rights violations appear to rely upon steps which
12 KAMMINGA, supra note 74, at 17-126; Simma & Alston, supra note 8, at 98-99.




are lawful but unfriendly, such as economic boycotts. 2 '
This is not to say that the non-legal character of human rights norms
makes no difference at all. If the argument of this paper were accepted, then
international tribunals would be disabled from applying any customary law
of human rights. Given the treaty based character of existing regional courts
of human rights and the lack of importance of action by the International
Court of Justice in this area, however, that qualification would seem to be
of limited significance. Also, as Professors Simma and Alston have
observed," the question has implications for domestic law. Even here,
however, the impact would seem to be limited. Admittedly this observation
is speculative, but it seems unlikely that domestic courts play a very
important role in enforcing human rights norms in states other than their
own. To be sure, the question might arise in the context of a court's
deciding whether there existed customary international legal norms that could
be applied in a purely domestic case. One may doubt, however, whether
customary law would ever be a very important source of such norms for
states whose courts and legislatures were receptive to human rights concepts.
Such a state is likely to have significant protection for human rights in its
domestic law.
The argument of this paper, then, comes down to two propositions. First,
an examination of international human rights treaty regimes and of non-treaty
formal international acts suggests that, while states have a right under
customary international law to take an interest in other states' compliance
with human rights norms, they have no obligation under that law to obey
such norms. Second, because of states' right to take an interest in other
states' human rights performance, and because any negative reaction in such
a case would almost certainly take the form of an act that though unfriendly,
was lawful, the non-legal status of human rights norms is irrelevant for most
purposes of international relations.
"u Ironically, this issue is complicated by the fallout of the World Conference on Human
Rights. If in fact a right to development becomes established in customary law, it would
obviously have the potential to render unlawful acts currently categorized as lawful but
unfriendly. That would in turn force more attention than is currently necessary to the
question of the precise legal character of human rights norms.
125 Simma & Alston, supra note 8, at 85-87.
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APPENDIX
KUALA LUMPUR DECLARATION ON HUMAN RIGHTS BY AIPO
Preamble
Whereas, the peoples of ASEAN recognize that all human beings are created
by the Almighty, and possess fundamental rights which are universal,
indivisible and inalienable;
Whereas, the peoples of ASEAN are born free and equal with full dignity
and rights and are endowed with reasoning and conscience enabling them to
act responsibly and humanely towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.
Whereas, the peoples of ASEAN realize that human beings cannot live alone
but in harmony with one another with nature and their environment to
achieve complete fulfilment of their aspirations in a just society based on
harmonious and balanced economic, social, political and cultural develop-
ments;
Whereas, the peoples of ASEAN recognize that human rights have two
mutually balancing aspects; those with respect to rights and freedom of the
individual and those which stipulate obligations of the individuals to society
and state;
Whereas, the peoples of ASEAN accept that human rights exist in a dynamic
and evolving context and that each country has inherent historical experienc-
es, and changing economic, social, political and cultural realities and value
system [sic] which should be taken into account.
Whereas, the peoples of ASEAN are convinced that human beings had a
right to development and freedom from poverty, hunger, illiteracy, ignorance,
injustice, diseases and other human miseries;
Whereas, the peoples of ASEAN reaffirm the observance of the United
Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights Charter, and the Vienna
Declaration and Program of Action of 25 June 1993;
Whereas, the continuing progress of ASEAN in freeing its people from fear
and want has enabled them to live in dignity;
[Vol. 25:99
EFFECT OF TREATiES
Whereas, ASEAN seeks to further enhance its role in promoting a world
order based on freedom, peace and social justice through international,





All human beings, individually and collectively, have a responsibility to
participate in their total development, taking in account the need for full
respect of their human rights as well as their duties to the community.
Freedom, progress and national stability are promoted by balance between
the rights of the individual and those of the community.
Article 2
All human beings, without distinction as to race, colour, sex, language,
religion, nationality, ethnic origin, family or social status, or personal
convictions have the right to live in dignity and to enjoy the fruits of
development and should, on their part, contribute to and participate in it.
Article 3
All human beings have the right to self-determination. By virtue of this
right, they freely determine their political status and may pursue their
economic, social, political and cultural development.
Article 4
Each member state has the right to development based on its own objectives,
to set its own priorities, and to decide the ways and means of realizing its
development without external interference.
Article 5
Universal promotion and protection of human rights should take place in the
context of international cooperation based on respect for national sovereign-
ty, territorial integrity and non-interference in the internal affairs of states,
and human rights should not be used as a conditionality for economic
cooperation and development assistance.
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Article 6
National development shall be founded on the basis of respect for the dignity
and value of human beings, which required the elimination of all forms of
inequality, exploitation, colonialism, racism, and the implementation of civil,




Everyone has the right to life. No one shall be deprived of such right except
in accordance with the law.
Article 8
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, opinion, conscience and
religion, these rights include freedom of teaching, practice, worship and
observance, both in private and public, individually or in community with
others.
Article 9
Everyone has the right to property, liberty and security of person. No one
shall be deprived of these rights except in accordance with law.
Article 10
Any violation of these fundamental human rights should be redressed in
accordance with law.
Part III
BASIC RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF CITIZENS AND STATES
Article 11
Everyone is equal before the law and is entitled to protection of the law
without any discrimination.
Article 12





Everyone has the right to freedom of association. No restrictions may be
imposed on the exercise of this right other than those prescribed by law.
Article 14
Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the right to be presumed
innocent until proven otherwise according to law.
Article 15
Everyone citizens [sic] has the right and should have the opportunity,
without unreasonable restrictions, to participate in the conduct of public
affairs directly or indirectly through freely chosen representatives, to vote
and to be elected to public office.
Article 16
It is the right and duty of each member state to formulate appropriate and
sustainable national development policies that aim at the constant improve-
ment of the well-being for all its citizens on the basis of active, free and
meaningful participation in development and in the fair distribution of the
benefits resulting therefrom.
Article 17
Each member state should undertake all necessary measure [sic] for the
realization of the rights [sic] to development and shall ensure equality of
opportunity for all its citizens in their access to basic resources, education,
health services, food, housing, employment, public services and the fair
distribution of income.
Article 18
Each member state should undertake appropriate economic, social, political,
technical and cultural measures in order to promote social justice.
Article 19
Each member state has the duty to encourage and facilitate the participation
of all citizens in all spheres of development to ensure full realization of
human rights.
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Article 20
It is the task and responsibility of each member state and every citizen to
ensure the promotion, implementation and protection of human rights.
Article 21
It is likewise the task and responsibility of member states to establish an
appropriate regional mechanism on human rights.
Article 22
Each member state and its citizens shall endeavor to exercise the aforemen-
tioned rights and duties subject only to such limitations as are determined by
law in respect of these rights and duties to meet the just requirement [sic] of
morality, public order and the general wellbeing of society.
